Introduction
The official political ideology in the Danish-Norwegian dual kingdom until the early eighteenth century is widely considered to have been a strongly theological divine right theory. It would, therefore, seem of great interest to know the circumstances and content of the first teaching of natural law in Copenhagen. This occurred during the years following a violent polemic between Christian Thomasius, the Leipzig jurisconsult and natural lawyer, and Hector Gottfried Masius, the court preacher to the Danish King Christian V, which culminated in Thomasius's writings being 1 burned on the public square in Copenhagen by the executioner and contributed to his banishment from Leipzig to Halle. 1 Nevertheless, the natural law theories of the first Danish teachers of the subject, Henrik Weghorst and Christian Reitzer, have not been the subject of detailed historical analysis. By offering such a study, this article aims to contribute to the scholarship on the history of post-Grotian natural law theorising in general and to the intellectual and political history of early enlightenment Denmark-Norway in particular.
Henrik Weghorst and Christian Reitzer in the historiography
Natural law as a prominent political discourse in the centuries following the publication of Hugo Grotius's De iure belli ac pacis in 1625 has received increasing scholarly attention in recent decades. The significance of natural law for the history of a wide range of disciplines, including moral and political philosophy, law, economics and theology, and a range of issues, including the development of the absolutist state, the relationship between church and state, theories of rights, secularisation and toleration in various forms of enlightenment, and in particular the distinctive contributions of Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius to so-called 'voluntarist' natural law have been investigated in detail. and Pufendorf's theories of natural law were by no means identical or indeed necessarily compatible, and so, how the two were combined would prove a decisive difference. Moreover, 'following' or 'being orientated towards' Grotius or Pufendorf, or a combination of the two, would always involve an act of interpretation, adaptation and use, which would influence the 'Grotian'
and 'Pufendorfian' natural law thus developed. It will be shown that Weghorst and Reitzer in fact developed two fundamentally different positions on natural law reflecting the different local academic contexts and discourses in which they were educated, Kiel and Halle.
The institutional context of natural law in Denmark-Norway
Although the absolutist constitution of Denmark-Norway, the Lex Regia, of 1665 was significantly influenced by the contractual framework of Grotian natural law, the constitution was kept secret and only published in 1709. The official ideology was one of divine right absolutism, as represented e.g. by the bishop Hans Wandal and the court preacher Hector Gottfried Masius.
While Masius's intentions with Interesse principum circa religionem Evangelicam (The Advantage
of the Evangelical Religion to the Princes), the work which sparked off the polemics with Thomasius, were primarily confessional, it included arguments highly critical of 'secular' natural law. Worried by the prospects of increased Calvinist immigration following the revocation of the edict of Nantes, he warned against the subversive nature of Calvinist religious doctrine, advising the King that his best interest lay in maintaining the purity of Lutheran doctrine among his subjects.
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As part of his argument that political order could only be maintained on the grounds of the true Lutheran religion, Masius had explicitly denied the validity of a natural law on the basis of reason. Divorced from revealed religion, natural law was a 'maimed and mutilated doctrine'. The duties towards God were taught exclusively by religion, while those towards oneself and others were determined partly by right reason and partly by religion. As such revealed religion should take 'first place' in any doctrine of natural law. According to Thomasius, it was Hugo Grotius who first had begun to rescue the 'noble discipline' of natural law and clean the 'dust of the schools' from it and thus given the discipline a high standing. 35 For an analysis of these issues in Pufendorf, see Hunter, Rival Enlightenments, chapter 4, in particular pp. 162ff.
the discipline similar to the one given by Thomasius.
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Among the greatest advances of the modern age was that the 'discipline of universal divine law' had been put on a firm foundation. Grotius was the first properly to distinguish natural and positive law. On this basis, the 'clouds' with which the scholastic moralists had obscured Scripture were dispersed, the boundaries between (divine) natural law and divine positive law were defined and each thus put on a secure basis. Despite his praise of Grotius in the preface, then, Reitzer, like Pufendorf and Thomasius, saw his break with scholasticism as incomplete in crucial respects. Indeed, Reitzer also followed the implications of Pufendorf's voluntarism for his understanding of man's moral nature and the character and principles of natural law. Of these two central topics, the first received the most thorough discussion, as the discussion of the second belonged to a later part of the work.
Reitzer's discussion of moral status, in which he followed Pufendorf's distinction between physical and moral entities, came in positio 23 on how man can hold rights.
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'Rights belong to a Natural law, then, was the law God had imposed on man to govern his behaviour in the 'natural state', bestowing on man certain rights and obligations. 43 As mentioned, Reitzer did not discuss natural law as an independent subject of a positio, but his position is evident from places where natural law is touched upon in discussing other issues. Thus, in positio 32 Reitzer made it clear that sociality, by which the temporal happiness of mankind is maintained, was the foundation of natural law. 44 From the fact that human nature was such that it could not be maintained without this law, one should conclude that God in fact obligated men to obey it: 'By the very act by which God the Creator of all things imposed on us a certain nature, which cannot be preserved without observing the laws of nature, the observation of these laws is understood to be imperatively imposed on us.'
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In the Positionum ex jure divino universali, then, Reitzer was effectively in the process of constructing an introduction to Pufendorfian natural law. This included presenting precisely the aspects of this system which were most controversial at the time, the strict distinction between moral theology and natural law, the strong moral voluntarism and doctrine of imposed statuses or personae, and sociality as the foundation of natural law. The wider significance of this becomes clear, when we consider the religious and political aims of Pufendorf's works on natural law. As
Ian Hunter has argued, Pufendorf had developed a 'detranscendentalised' theory of natural law to promote the 'secularisation' of the early modern state. In doing so Pufendorf had reformed the discipline of natural law that had held together a philosophical-theological synthesis that was centred in the faculties of theology and helped secure the influence of theologians in the politicalreligious constitution of the early modern confessional state. Pufendorf's works on natural law thus had important consequences for the nature of the state and were part of a contest between two professional groups about the authority to determine the social and political order of the state, the theologians or the jurists.
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In adopting the more radical aspects of Pufendorf's theory of natural law, Reitzer was simultaneously championing this political programme. actions were eternally and in themselves good and provided a fundamental framework for God's creation. Natural law was the means by which man was obligated to do those things good in themselves and avoid those bad in themselves: 'and hence it is that that which the Law of Nature enjoins or forbids is not, respectively, good or bad merely because God has of his free will decided to enjoin the one or forbid he other; but since the former is in its essence wholly good and the latter wholly bad, God could not but forbid this and enjoin that.'
Christian natural law: Weghorst's Compendii iuris naturae dissertatio prima
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In further determining the specific precepts of natural law, Rachel turned first to discuss the alternative 'systems' for determining these laws. Having presented contemporary theories, including those of Selden, Sharrock, Cherbury, Cumberland and Hobbes, he finally turned to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics for a method for the discipline of natural law or 'scientia philosophiae moralis'.
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Having set down as first principles the existence of God, divine providence and the immortality of the soul, Rachel on this basis developed the laws of nature governing man's society with God and with other humans.
In order to determine these, Rachel argued, one must first ask 'What is the ultimate end of man considered as a political animal by nature, ζῶον φύσει πολιτικόν? That end, I say, is conformity or congruence of the human will, which is the proximate principle of moral conduct, with the Divine will, as expressed in natural laws.'
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In so doing man would not only express the 51 'Hujus igitur Legis Aeternae radii sunt Leges Naturales, quas nobis Ratio, divinae particula aurae, which was becoming increasingly in vogue, and which was spearheaded in Copenhagen by his colleague Reitzer.
Grotius's theory of natural law in De iure belli fitted Weghorst's purposes in that it allowed him to argue that certain things were necessarily in accordance with 'rational nature' as an objective basis of natural law. In other words, he could use Grotius as an authority for the 'perseitas' or the inherentness of virtue and vice as the object of natural law: 'Therefore according to the opinion of Grotius there are actions necessarily conforming or contrary to rational nature, and which by their nature are prior to natural law'.
59
This was a 'necessity' of the 'moral action' which was independent of the determination of any law, but which rather showed which actions the law should determine as obligatory and thus invest with a 'legal necessity'. 62 'Fundamentum itaque juris naturae, sunt actus hominum in se moraliter boni & male' Ibid., cap.1 §13.
As I see it, it is indubitable that those actions without which or by which society among humans is destroyed pertain to natural law. But that all the precepts of natural law have as their end that human society is maintained, I believe should be rejected. No indeed, from the following it will be clear that those precepts which seem to have as their end the maintenance of society do not have this as their final end.
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Where Grotius had secularised natural law by positing sociality as a necessary and sufficient foundation and by his etiamsi daremus-principle, and where Pufendorf had detranscendentalised natural law with his radical voluntarism, Weghorst reinforced the transcendent character of natural law and moved God centre stage by positing the love of God as the foundation of natural law:
Disregarding the opinions of others, I consider that man is created first and foremost for this end: that he should love God. And since the love of God is good in itself, God also obliges man to do so by the natural law. From this it is evident that the basis of natural law should be determined in accordance with the end of man, so that accordingly the basis of natural law is the love of God, of oneself, and one's fellow man. Of these the love of God is the foremost end.
[…] Neither indeed do they err, who posit the basis of natural law solely in the love of God, for from this cannot but follow the love of men. realising the end -finis -for which man has been created. Finally, to Weghorst sociality was not the fundamental principle as it could, he argued, encompass neither man's duties to himself nor to God.
65
Having appropriated Grotius's use of the perseitas-doctrine only to argue for an alternative foundation of natural law to sociality, Weghorst continued to further distinguish his position from the aspects of Grotius's position that tended towards a secularised conception of natural law.
Against Grotius's argument that natural law would oblige if there was no God, he put forward a voluntarist concept of obligation. Following Caspar Ziegler, he argued that it was God as a supreme legislator that promulgated the law of nature and invested it with obligatory force.
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Nevertheless, as we have seen, God did so in accordance with the essential goodness of certain actions. In this way Weghorst adopted, again following Ziegler, the scholastic doctrine of an 'eternal law' in accordance with which God acted: 'moreover, we do not deny that the principle of this 
Perspectives into the eighteenth century
Seen against the background of the official theological divine right ideology in Denmark-Norway 78 Thus it has been pointed out that Holberg passed over Pufendorf's doctrine of the distinction between entia physica and moralia in silence. 79 A reason for this may have been that this doctrine was closely connected to Pufendorf's criticism of a 'bonum morale ante legem', the position which, as we have seen, Weghorst was championing in those years.
That this arose perhaps not entirely from strategic considerations on Holberg's part is brought out in a controversy over the marriage between close relatives that broke out a few years later; a controversy which also showed some of the wider religious-political issues at stake in the competition between different forms of natural law. The controversy surrounded a dissertation that the young Andreas Hojer (1690-1739) from Schleswig had written while in Helmstedt and published in Lemgow, Germany in 1718. 80 Hojer had studied under Christian Thomasius in 1707-9
and drew on Thomasius's theory of natural law to argue that marriage between closely related was not prohibited by natural law in a strict sense nor by positive divine law (although it was contrary to Christian perfection), and was only prohibited by the positive laws of the sovereign in the interest of social order. 81 Hojer, a longtime rival of Holberg, returned to Copenhagen to pursue a career there, and the pamphlet was brought to the attention to some of the professors of theology.
Hojer was summoned for interrogation by the professors, and Holberg wrote a pamphlet under pseudonym criticising Hojer's arguments.
The difference between Holberg's and Hojer's positions, both considered proponents of Pufendorfian and Thomasian natural law, is illustrative of the different ways this form of natural law was appropriated and used. Holberg first of all declared that he would leave the issue of divine positive law to the judgement of the theologians, the proper authorities on the subject. This did not mean, however, that Pufendorfian-Thomasian natural law had finally attained hegemony. For now, the opponents defending these doctrines were Christian Wolff and his disciples.
Conclusion
Existing scholarship has described the history of natural law in early enlightenment Denmark- 
